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Constructing a New Federalism
INTRODUCTION
The ascent to power of the Republican-controlled 104th Congress early in
1995 brought with it the promise of "devolution," that is, a reallocation of
power from the federal government to state and local governments. The
Republican leadership promised legislation to devolve power to the states in
areas such as welfare, school lunch programs, legal services for the poor,
speed limits on interstate highways, and other spheres in which the federal
government had played a dominant role for decades. No longer would we have
"one size fits all" government; instead, the Republican leadership vowed,
policy would be made and programs would be administered at a level closer
to the citizenry, in a manner presumably more responsive to local needs.
In the midst of this devolutionary agenda, the Republicans also promised
a series of sweeping proposals for reform of the system of tort litigation. Billed
in the Contract with America as the "Common Sense Legal Reform Act," the
proposed Republican legislation included "[l]oser pays laws, reasonable limits
on punitive damages and reform of product liability laws to stem the endless
tide of litigation."' Under these reforms, designed "to renew America,"'
frivolous litigation would be nipped in the bud, extortionate demands on
corporate enterprise would get short shrift, and tasseled-loafered personal
injury lawyers would be sent packing.
True to their word, the Republican leaders introduced tort reform
legislation shortly after the 104th Congress convened. Bills were introduced in
the House and Senate to curtail products liability suits, limit punitive damages,
regulate attorneys' fees, and "reform" various other aspects of tort law. The
sponsors of this legislation neglected to mention a troublesome but obvious
point: Tort law, since the founding of the Republic, has been an area almost
exclusively reserved to the states. The Republican proposals would, in effect,
nationalize3 many aspects of the tort system. 4 Thus, while devolving school
1. The Contract with America is a set of promises made by Republican congressional candidates
during the 1994 election campaign. It includes a list of bills that the Republicans promised to bring to
the floor during the 104th Congress. The "Common Sense Legal Reform Act" is ninth on this list.
2. The phrase "to renew America" is taken from the title of House Speaker Newt Gingrich's book,
published in 1994.
3. To the extent possible, I have used the word "nationalize" rather than "federalize." The term
"federal" most appropriately refers to a system of division of powers between the national government
and the states; to "federalize" might therefore mean no more than to distribute power among the state
and national governments. The term "federal government" usually connotes the government based in
Washington, but "national" is more precise.
In James Madison's time, the "federalists" advocated the accretion of power by the national, or
"federal" government. In today's topsy-turvy, newspeak world, self-proclaimed "federalists" advocate
the devolution of power from the federal government to the states.
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lunch programs, legal services for the poor and aid to families with dependent
children (not to mention speed limits on interstate highways), under the
Republican program, the federal government would assert new authority over
areas which had been traditionally state government concerns.
The motivation for such seemingly contradictory proposals seems obvious.
In areas (such as welfare) in which the federal government had been deemed
too generous to the poor, it would be stripped of authority. In other areas (such
as tort litigation) in which the states had recognized individual rights to the
detriment of corporate prerogatives, the federal government would assert new-
found power to keep the states in line.5 The choice between devolution and
nationalization was not a matter of constitutional or even political principle;
rather, it was a simple matter of whose ox was being gored. Growing hostility
to the legal profession-due to lawyer excesses6 as well as to the impatience
with the legal process that arises when right-wing elements are in ascendan-
cy-had created a politically hospitable atmosphere for measures that had long
been the agenda of corporate interests. The new Republican congressional
majority was not about to let this opportunity pass it by.
The politics of the moment aside, however, there may be valid reasons for
nationalizing certain areas of tort law. The fact that tort law has long been the
province of the states does not mean that it should be forever off-limits to
federal intervention. Sound bases in constitutional law and public policy might
justify congressional action and federal court jurisdiction. Certain causes of
action in tort may involve constitutionally-guaranteed rights; others may have
4. At least one Republican lawmaker was forthright about the implications of this legislation. On
May 3, 1995, Senator Fred Thompson remarked:
The issue before us essentially is should the U.S. Congress federalize certain portions of our
judicial system that, up until now, have been under the province of the States? ... I would
remind many of my Republican brethren that we ran for office and were elected last year on the
basis of our strong belief that the government that is closest to the people is the best
government; that Washington does not always know best; that more responsibility should be
given to the States because that is where most of the creative ideas and innovations are
happening. Whether it be unfunded mandates, welfare reform, or regulations that are strangling
productivity, we took the stand that the States and local government should have a greater say
about how people's lives are going to be run, and the Federal government less.
141 CONG. REC. S6047 (1995).
5. Professor George Priest during this symposium suggested a consistent theme underlying the
Republican agenda: to exert pressure to prevent the states from redistributing resources from productive
to unproductive sectors. Implicit in this statement is a generalization that tort defendants are, as a rule,
productive, whereas tort plaintiffs are unproductive. Viewed charitably, the statement nevertheless
reinforces the thesis that the Republican agenda is not a structural one based on federalism, but rather
a substantive one based on distribution of wealth.
6. It was a happy coincidence for the Republicans that the seemingly endless O.3. Simpson trial
commenced in a Los Angeles courtroom just as the 104th Congress convened. That trial caricatured the
very worst suspicions that Americans harbored about lawyers. It portrayed lawyers as preening publicity
hounds, quick to make any argument that would work to advantage, but agonizingly slow and inefficient
when it came to consumption of court time and public resources. The Simpson trial did for the legal
profession what the movie Marathon Man did for the dental profession. Indeed, watching the Simpson
trial was like having one's teeth pulled without benefit of anesthesia.
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a significant impact on interstate commerce; still others may intersect with a
federal funding scheme. Sound reasons may remain, however, either as a
matter of constitutional law or good policy, to leave significant areas of tort
law to the states.
In this Article, I will first describe the constitutional bases for federal
involvement in tort law. With the constitutional zones of federal tort interven-
tion circumscribed, I will then consider which areas of tort law are most
appropriate for federal intervention as a matter of policy. My analysis will
focus primarily on legislative power and policy, and not the related issue of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts (although the latter issue will invariably enter
the picture).7 In this vein, I will examine recent proposals by both the
Republican Congress and the Democratic Clinton Administration for both their
constitutionality and their policy implications.' Ultimately, I will attempt to set
forth a principled basis for federal intervention in tort law, resting upon sound
constitutional theory and public policy, rather than partisan, interest-group
politics.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR FEDERAL TORT LEGISLATION
It has been long understood that the government of the United States is one
of limited powers; that is, that Congress's power to legislate extends only to
those areas enumerated in the Constitution. This principle is reinforced by the
Tenth Amendment, under which "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." 9 Thus, any tort legislation enacted by
Congress must be based on a power enumerated under the Constitution. 1
7. For discussions of the appropriate forum for tort litigation, see, e.g., Victor Eugene Flango,
How Would the Abolition of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Affect State Courts?, 74 JUDICATURE 35
(1990); Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1990); LindaS. Mullenix, Mass
Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalization, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 755 (1995); Dolores K.
Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV.
1671 (1992).
8. I will not attempt to be encyclopedic in this analysis. The fluidity of pending legislation defies
comprehensive coverage.
9. Justice O'Connor has explained:
In some cases the Court has inquired whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of
the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitution. In other cases the Court has
sought to determine whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty
reserved by the Tenth Amendment... . If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution,
the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power
is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power
the Constitution has not conferred on Congress . ... It is in this sense that the Tenth
Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992) (most citations omitted).
10. The Supreme Court generally has construed the Constitution so as to give Congress the ability
to enact legislation reasonably calculated to carry out its enumerated powers. Article I, § 8 of the
Constitution includes not only most of Congress's enumerated powers, but also the "necessary and
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I suggest three constitutional bases for federal involvement in tort law. The
first of these involves tort remedies either protecting or infringing upon rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The second basis for federal
intervention involves activities having an impact on interstate commerce.
Finally, Congress might legitimately interfere with tort law while exercising the
power of the purse. I shall examine each of these in order.
A. Tort Remedies Involving Constitutional Rights
1. Tort Remedies Protecting Constitutional Rights
a. State Action
Implicit in the Constitution, and somewhat more explicit in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment," is Congress's power to enact legislation providing
for tort remedies to protect the constitutional rights of private citizens. The
most obvious example of such legislation is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, providing a
remedy for interference with one's civil rights under color of state law. The
statute has long been justified under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 2 In the absence of an analogous statute providing a
remedy for interference with one's civil rights under color of federal law, the
United States Supreme Court created one in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.3 Indeed, the Bivens opinion rested on
the notion that where a right exists under the Constitution, it is incumbent on
the courts to fashion a remedy to redress its violation."1
It is therefore well established that Congress has the authority to enact
proper" Clause, explicitly empowering Congress to enact legislation conducive to the exercise of its
other powers. This implicit power would probably exist even in the absence of the "necessary and
proper" Clause. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300 (2d ed. 1988). The Court
has maintained that the founders' intention was not to enumerate the specific means that Congress could
adopt to carry out the enumerated powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408-09
(1819). Rather, the intent of any constitution is to establish the broad scope of government, not the
minute details of its operation. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. Thus, the absence of a constitutional
provision specifically empowering Congress to regulate tort litigation does not preclude that body from
enacting legislation affecting tort law, so long as it can find its basis in an enumerated power.
There remains the issue of whether Congress can intervene in the tort field, or any other field, using
an enumerated power chiefly as a pretext for activity otherwise reserved to the states. In McCulloch,
Chief Justice Marshall warned that Congress must not abuse its authority by enacting laws "under the
pretext" of exercising powers actually granted to it. Id. at 423. Thereafter, however, the Supreme Court
has been reluctant to inquire into a statute's "real" purposes or its drafters' "true" motives. See TRIBE,
supra, at 302 & n.9. Recent decisions of the Court suggest, however, that it may be prepared to more
carefully scrutinize the exercise of congressional power. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.
Ct. 1114 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
11. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) states, "the Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Similar language appears in § 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment (1865) and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment (1870).
12. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
13. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
14. Id. at 397.
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legislation providing for a civil action, i.e., an action in tort, to obtain
compensation for injuries to constitutionally protected interests caused by state
actors. 15 Because most constitutionally protected interests involve freedom
from governmental interference, federal tort remedies of this genre will
normally be predicated on state action (or at least action "under color of law"),
as in actions brought under § 1983. The literature regarding the appropriate
boundaries of such actions is vast, 16 and I will not attempt to summarize it
here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that a private cause of
action may accrue when a state or state official's interference with an
individual's rights rises to a constitutional level.
17
Nonetheless, the Court has resisted efforts to make the Fourteenth
Amendment "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may
already be administered by the States." 8 Thus, in Paul v. Davis, the Court
found that a man who had been called an "active shoplifter" in flyers
distributed by police suffered no Fourteenth Amendment deprivation resulting
from injury to his reputation. In Parratt v. Taylor, 9 the Court found that a
state's own tort remedy provided sufficient due process of law to a prisoner
whose property had been lost due to the state's negligence. And in Daniels v.
Williams, 0 the Court decided that a state employee's negligence that resulted
in an inmate's slip-and-fall on a prison stairway did not give rise to a due
process claim, even if the defendant could claim immunity under state law.
b. Private Actors
The basis for federal legislation proteting individuals against interference
of constitutional rights by private actors2 ' is quite complex, and the source
and potential extent of such protection are far from clear.' Title 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1982 (neither of which explicitly provide for a private cause of
action) have been interpreted to allow a cause of action against private actors
15. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171-72.
16. See, e.g., Gary S. Gildin, Immunizing Intentional Violations of Constitutional Rights Through
Judicial Legislation: The Extension of Harlow v. Fitzgerald to Section 1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J.
369 (1989); Laura Oren, Immunity andAccountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50
U. PrIT. L. REV. 935 (1989); Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort, Monroe v. Pape, and the
Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 277 (1965); Michael Wells, The Past and Future of
Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REv. 53
(1986); Christina B. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980).
17. Such an action might be subject to a maze of complex immunities for governments and officials.
See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Gary S. Gildin, The Standard of Culoabiity in Section 1983 Bivens
Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualfied Immunity and the Constitution, 11 HOFSrRA L. REv. 557
(1983); Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV.
225 (1986).
18. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
19. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
20. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
21. That is, neither the state, state officials, nor persons acting under color of state law.
22. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 926 (12th ed. 1991).
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who engage in discrimination.' These statutes find their justification in the
Thirteenth Amendment and apply to instances of racial discrimination.24
Tide 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), drawn from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,1
provides for a civil action against individuals who conspire to deprive persons
"of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws. . ."I In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Supreme Court indicated that
"there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action" 27 to support an action
under § 1985(3). In Bray v. Alexandria Wmen's Health Clinic,s the Court
stated that "[w]hatever may be the precise meaning of 'class' for purposes of
Griffin's speculative extension beyond race," the term did not embrace women
seeking abortion.29 It remains unclear as to whether § 1985 is supported only
by the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of racial discrimination (supported
by § 2 of that amendment), or by the broader coverage of the Fourteenth
Amendment (along with the enabling language of § 5). What is fairly clear is
that the Court will attempt to avoid "the constitutional shoals that would lie in
the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law."30 Thus the
Court has attempted, with respect to both public and private defendants, to
delineate constitutional causes of action so as not to create general federal tort
law offering protections barely distinguishable from those provided by the
states.31
Congress reacted to Bray by enacting the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act (FACE)32 in 1994. FACE provides for criminal and civil
remedies against anyone who "by force or threat of force or by physical
obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to
23. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 applied to racial discrimination
in admissions to private school held open to public); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968) (42 U.S.C. § 1982 applied to private racial discrimination in sale of real estate).
24. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 179; Jones, 392 U.S. at 439.
25. 42 U.S.C.A § 1985 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995). Congress designed the Act and its criminal
counterpart (18 U.S.C. § 241) to combat private conspiracies to deprive individuals of their civil rights
(common in the chaotic post-Civil War period). Although the Act had potentially enormous scope, it
went unused for nearly a century. In 1951, the Supreme Court eviscerated the act by holding that
§ 1985(3) reached only conspiracies arising under color of state law. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341
U.S. 651 (1951). The Court performed an about-face two decades later in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971), holding that § 1985(3) provides a remedy against wholy private conspiracies to deprive
one of one's civil rights.
26. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971).
27. Id. at 102.
28. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). The case involved a claim against abortion protesters brought by
abortion clinics and supporting organizations.
29. Id. at 759; see also United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1982) (denying
§ 1985(3) claim brought by non-union workers assaulted by union sympathizers).
30. Gniffn, 403 U.S. at 102.
31. More recently, the Court has curtailed congressional power to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity with respect to matters outside the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
32. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West Supp. 1995).
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injure, intimidate or interfere with" any person obtaining or providing
reproductive health services33 or any person "lawfully exercising or seeking
to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of
religious worship." 34 While subsection (a)(1) of FACE (regarding access to
abortion clinics) might be justified on Commerce Clause grounds, 35 subsection
(a)(2) (protecting access to places of religious worship) would almost certainly
have to find its justification on the basis of other provisions of the Constitution,
most notably the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 6 To date, there have
been no cases upholding the statute on that basis; 37 indeed, the extent of
congressional power to enact remedies against private citizens who obstruct the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights remains an open question. It would
appear, however, that the Court will frown upon congressional efforts to
provide remedies against private actors for interference with rights protected
under the Constitution against only state interference.38 The "access to
churches" provisions of FACE may therefore fail to pass constitutional muster,
unless their proponents can show an interference with a right guaranteed by the
Constitution against private interference, such as the right to interstate travel.
2. Congressional Power to Limit Tort Remedies That Impair the
Exercise of Constitutional Rights
Another question arises as to whether constitutional limitations on tort
actions create space for federal legislation. Since 1964, the Supreme Court has
actively intervened in one area of tort law-defamation-not to create remedies,
but to limit, on First Amendment grounds, remedies under causes of action
recognized under state law.39 Does judicial recognition of a federal interest
33. Id. § 248(a)(1).
34. Id. § 248(a)(2). This unusual combination of protections appears to have been a result of
political log-rolling between Senators Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Hatch (R-Utah). See 139 Cong. Rec. S
14,461-71 (1993). Subsection (2) originated as an amendment-sponsored by Hatch-to Kennedy's
original FACE bill. 139 Cong. Rec. S15,655, S15,660 (Nov. 16, 1993). In essence, pro-choice
advocates were able to enact subsection (a)(1) by supporting the call by religious advocates for
enactment of subsection (a)(2).
35. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
36. The Act in fact recites a Fourteenth Amendment justification. Pub. L. No. 103-259, § 2.
37. In United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit upheld the clinic
access provisions of FACE on Commerce Clause grounds. The Court therefore never reached the
Fourteenth Amendment question. In a footnote, however, the Court stated, "We fail to see how the
dissent can avoid the Fourteenth Amendment issue, however, since Section 5 provides an independent
basis of legislative power." Id. at 679 n.4.
38. The Court has been unwilling to apply § 1985(3) against interference with rights that are by
definition protected only against state interference (e.g., abortion and association), and has applied it
only against interference with rights protected under the Constitution against private interference (i.e.,
the right to interstate travel and rights under the Thirteenth Amendment). Compare Bray Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 764 (1993) and United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S.
825, 830-34 (1982) with Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
39. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 467 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
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in this area invite more substantive federal intervention, such that Congress
could fashion a federal defamation remedy to supplant state law? Arguably,
Congress's powers ° under the Fourteenth Amendment empower it to do just
that. Likewise, could Congress enact limitations on actions for misrepresenta-
tion, based again on the First Amendment?"1 To date, there has been little
congressional interest in either area,42 so the question remains largely
unanswered.
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has scrutinized punitive damages
awarded under state law (primarily, but not exclusively, in tort claims) to
determine whether they violate due process protections embedded in the
Constitution.43 In at least one instance, the Court has found a state's procedur-
al protections wanting." This year, the Court found a punitive damages
award "grossly excessive" and therefore unconstitutional on substantive
grounds. 45 The Court's recent activity in this area is analogous to that in the
defamation cases: in both instances, the Court has read the Constitution as
placing limitations on remedies under state causes of action.46 In the case of
punitive damages as well as defamation, it is fair to ask whether the Court's
appropriation of new constitutional ground is an invitation for congressional
intervention. This inquiry is not entirely academic, as several recent legislative
(1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). For a summary of these and other leading Supreme Court cases involving defamation, see
Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through Uniform Legislation: The Search
for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REV. 291, 297-99 (1994).
40. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966), established that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
41. Judicial activism in the field of defamation has not been duplicated with respect to the law of
misrepresentation, notwithstanding the First Amendment interests involved in both areas. Commercial
speech normally involved in misrepresentation cases has enjoyed less Constitutional protection than the
political speech often (but not always-see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749 (1985)) involved in defamation cases. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985). Nevertheless, a Congress intent on protecting commercial interests might
seize upon a First Amendment rationale to limit remedies for misrepresentation.
42. But see H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., lst Sess. (1985) (bill introduced by Rep. Charles Schumer that
would have established federal cause of action for libel with declaratory judgment remedy).
43. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994); TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 271 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1
(1991).
44. Honda Motor Co., 114 S. Ct. 2331.
45. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996). In addition to articulating due
process concerns, the Court stated that the defendant's "status as an active participant in the national
economy implicates the federal interest in preventing individual states from imposing undue burdens on
interstate commerce." Id. at 1604.
46. Conservatives who raised the clarion call of states' rights in objection to the Court's
intervention in Sullivan and its progeny now cheer the Court's willingness to cast its shadow over
punitive damages. Liberals who shed no tears over the evisceration of the law of libel and slander on
First Amendment grounds now lament the Court's intrusion on the sacred American right to realize the
American dream through an obscene jury award. Again, it appears to be a matter of whose ox is being
gored.
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proposals include limitations on punitive damages.47
B. Activities Having an Impact on Interstate Commerce
The most obvious constitutional basis for congressional intervention in tort
law is the commerce power. Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution grants
Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Over time, the Supreme Court
has elaborated upon the breadth of the Commerce Clause and the correspond-
ing congressional power. Initially, the Court interpreted the Commerce Clause
to limit the scope of Congress's regulatory power to interstate commerce and
not to commercial transactions taking place entirely intrastate.48 Early
Supreme Court opinions also distinguished "commerce" from "manufacturing,"
"production," and other activities that were normally controlled by state laws
and regulations.49
However, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ,1 the Supreme Court
upheld the National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause challenge,
departing from the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects on
interstate commerce.51 Later, in Wickard v. Filburn,52 the Court instituted
a new test by asking whether or not Congress's regulation of a farmer's
overproduction of wheat for home consumption had a "substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce."' Recently, the Court explained that Congress
may constitutionally: (1) "regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce;" S' (2) "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities; 5 and (3) "regulate those activities
47. E.g., H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1995) (version passed by Congress capping
punitive damages awards at either: (1) greater of twice sum of economic and non-economic loss awards
or $250,000, subject to additional award by judge up to jury's original award; or (2) lesser of same
computation if defendant is individual with net worth less than $500,000 or corporation that employs
fewer than 25 full-time employees); H.R. 352, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1995) (pertaining to
"manufacturers of medical products" and capping punitive damages awards at twice total damages);
H.R. 1195, 104th Cong., ist Sess. § 204 (1995) (capping awards at greater of twice compensatory
damages award or $250,000). Many, if not all, of these proposals could pass constitutional muster on
Commerce Clause grounds. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
48. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In a subsequent decision involving tort
law, the Court invalidated a statute creating a negligence action against common carriers for personal
injuries sustained by employees in the course of employment. The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S.
463 (1908). The Court reasoned that the statute "regulates the persons because they engage in interstate
commerce and does not alone regulate the business of interstate commerce." Id. at 497.
49. See United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624,
1627 (1995).
50. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
51. Id. at 36-38.
52. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
53. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125; see also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
54. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
55. Id.
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having a substantial relationship to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce." 56 With Jones & Laughlin,
Wickard and their progeny,57 it became apparent that the Court would give
Congress a wide berth for the enactment of legislation based on the commerce
power.
In this context, the Court's 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez came
as something of a surprise.58 In Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense to "knowingly...
possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause
to believe, is a school zone."59 While Justice Breyer's dissent reasoned that
the possession of firearms in and around schools has an adverse effect on
education, and that such a burden on education has a detrimental effect on
interstate commerce,' o the Lopez majority focused upon the fact that the
wholly intrastate possession of firearms has little effect on interstate economic
activities.61 The language of the opinion is a warning to federal lawmakers
that the Court will not allow the wholesale expansion of legislative power based
on attenuated arguments invoking the Commerce Clause.
It is difficult at this stage to determine whether the Lopez opinion represents
a sea change for the Supreme Court, or a mere dogleg in the Court's otherwise
expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence.62 The implications of Lopez for
tort law are even less clear. In the eight months following the Lopez decision,
three circuits have had the opportunity to consider the constitutionality of
FACE.63 All three circuits upheld the statute on Commerce Clause
56. Id. at 1630.
57. Significant among these are Heart of Atianta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding public accommodations provisions of 1964
Civil Rights Act on Commerce Clause grounds).
58. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
59. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (West 1976 & Supp. 1995).
60. See 115 S. Ct. at 1657.
61. In his majority opinion, the Chief Justice concluded "that the proper test requires an analysis
of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." Id. at 1630. Neither the
likelihood that the firearm had passed through interstate commerce nor the effect of education on
interstate commerce was sufficient under this test. "To uphold the Government's contentions here,"
wrote the Chief Justice, "we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States." Id. at 1634. One commentator has likened the "substantial effect" concept in
Lopez to the notion of proximate cause in tort law. Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 674, 679 (1995).
62. The case was decided by a 5-4 margin. Justice Kennedy wrote a cautious concurring opinion,
115 S. Ct. at 1634, in which Justice O'Connor joined. (Justice Thomas's concurring opinion, id. at
1642, was not nearly so cautious.) The holding need not be viewed as a radical departure from post-New
Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It would not take a troglodyte to conclude that the mere
possession of a firearm in a school zone is an activity that is neither interstate nor commerce, and that
the commerce rationale involved at least one bootstrap too many.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 248. For a description of FACE, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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grounds.' Because these cases involved criminal prosecutions under the
"access to clinics" provisions of FACE, they are instructive, but by no means
determinative, regarding the reach of the commerce power in tort actions. The
distinction between criminal and civil actions in this context may be one
without a difference. I can see no basis for holding that the Commerce Clause
allows certain activity to be subject to federal prosecution, but not to a federal
tort action. But the applicability of the commerce power to FACE's "access to
churches" provisions is far less clear. Lopez seems to say that it will be more
difficult to show that non-economic activities confined to a single state
"substantially affect commerce." Granted, churchgoers occasionally cross state
lines to attend religious services, and the hymnals they use (like the gun Mr.
Lopez brought to school) are likely to move in interstate commerce. Whether
these activities are substantial enough (i.e., like interstate demand for abortion
services) to pass through Lopez's filter is another matter.'
Notwithstanding Lopez, it is apparent that certain areas of activity with
direct implications for interstate commerce will continue to be regarded as
subject to federal intervention. It is difficult, for example, to read Lopez as
barring congressional intervention in the law of products liability. Federal
products liability regulation may be regarded as an effort to "regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons and things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities."' Furthermore, products liability litigation can be regarded as an
activity that "substantially affect[s] interstate commerce." 67 While I would
hesitate to argue that current state products liability law imposes such a burden
on commerce as to implicate the Constitution's dormant commerce power,68
there is ample justification for Congress to act in a proactive manner and even
to preempt the field.
As to other areas of potential tort regulation, the Commerce Clause is less
viable as a rationale. Products liability aside, most tort actions involve not
commercial transactions with interstate repercussions, but rather discrete
64. United States v. Wilson, No. 95-1871, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 37375 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'g
880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995); American Life
League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995).
65. The Wilson court found the "substantial relationship test" to be a matter of degree and was
willing to grant much deference to specific commerce-related findings of Congress. Wilson, 73 F.3d at
697. The Supreme Court had rejected general findings in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
66. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629; see also Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern Ry.
Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
67. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30; see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1969); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
68. Under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court will invalidate facially neutral state laws that
place an "undue burden" on interstate commerce-in other words, where the burden of a state law to
interstate commerce is excessive in relation to its putative local benefits. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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conduct that is local in nature. While the interstate movement of motor
vehicles69 and the increasingly commercial nature of medical practice would
almost certainly qualify motor vehicle accidents and medical malpractice for
federal regulation under the commerce power, it is doubtful that litigation over
a supermarket slip-and-fall would be viewed as having a "substantial effect"
on commerce, as Lopez requires.7' As one moves through a continuum of tort
cases-ranging from products liability, through motor vehicle accidents,
professional malpractice, supermarket slip and fall cases, to the simplest of
cases, that of a small boy pulling a chair out from under an elderly wom-
an7 t-one can see a gradual attenuation of the commerce power as a rationale
for federal tort legislation.' It would be difficult to say that litigation over a
backyard accident "substantially affects" interstate commerce, except for one
characteristic common to most, if not all tort claims: insurance.
Insurance links the overwhelming majority of tort claims, whatever their
origin, to interstate commerce. But, one might ask, does that characteristic
alone provide a sufficient tie to justify pervasive federal intervention in tort
cases? Insurance certainly involves interstate commerce, and tort liability may
be closely enough linked to insurance markets so as to "substantially affect
commerce." However, it is unclear whether insurance is analogous to the
ketchup at Ollie's Barbeque (which, together with other supplies that had
traveled interstate, provided sufficient nexus in Katzenbach v. McClung);73 or
whether it is more akin to the purchase of the firearm in Lopez, which, though
a commercial transaction, was too long a bootstrap to bring the Gun Free
School Zones Act under the Commerce Clause.
As with the mere possession of a firearm in Lopez, tort litigation over
localized events may be seen by some future court as not having a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. Just as the national market in firearms was
69. It would be ironic if the federal government were to acquire power over automobile accident
litigation shortly after it devolved power over speed limits on interstate highways. See National Highway
System Designation Act of 1995, Nov. 28, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-59 § 205 (Repeal of National
Maximum Speed Limit Compliance Program).
70. Should a slip-and-fall at a supermarket (which sells goods that have moved in interstate
commerce) be likened to discrimination at Ollie's Barbeque (which sold $70,000 in foodstuffs that had
moved in interstate commerce)? See Katzenbach v. McKlung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Or is it more
analogous to the events in Lopez, where a student carried a handgun (which had moved in interstate
commerce) into a school that used books and other supplies that had traveled in interstate commerce?
In each case, it would appear that the purpose underlying the challenged statute had little or no relation
to commerce, and that the commerce power was but a pretext for federal intervention. I would have
preferred for the Court to have employed the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as justifications
for the civil rights statute upheld in Katzenbach; that would make it easier to distinguish from Lopez.
71. See Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
72. Professor Deborah Jones Merritt has suggested the use of fuzzy logic in commerce power
determinations. Merritt, supra note 61, at 738-50. Employing fuzzy logic, we would say that products
liability is very much interstate commerce, medical malpractice is somewhat interstate commerce, and
a supermarket slip-and-fall is a little bit interstate commerce, etc. See id. at 742-743.
73. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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insufficient in Lopez, the existence of a national market in insurance may not
satisfy some future court looking for a greater connection between tortious
conduct and interstate commerce. Devolutionists' arguments against the
wholesale expansion of federal power may return to haunt them if national tort
legislation is struck down by a Supreme Court more willing to clip congressio-
nal wings.'
C. The Spending Power
A third rationale for federal intervention in tort law is the spending power.
The Constitution grants Congress the authority to collect taxes and make
expenditures for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States.75 Spending, however, is not mandatory. Many government benefits are
gratuitous in a constitutional sense, because Congress need not grant them.76
It flows from this that Congress has the lesser power to condition the grant of
public funds, because it has the greater power not to grant the funds in the first
place.77 Congress might therefore indirectly influence state tort law by
conditioning the flow of federal largess on the enactment of certain measures
78affecting tort litigation.
Historically, Congress has in fact used the power of the purse to regulate
indirectly in a number of fields that had been traditionally state concerns.
These efforts have almost always been upheld by the Supreme Court. For
example, in South Dakota v. Dole,79 the Court upheld a statute under which
federal highway funds were to be withheld from any state that failed to enact
legislation prohibiting the purchase or possession of alcoholic beverages by
persons under the age of twenty-one. The Court found the statute consistent
with each of the four limitations on the spending power: (1) The exercise of the
74. Senator Thompson recognized this irony, stating:
It is ironic that all of this is occurring at a time when the philosophical battle that we have
been fighting for so many years is finally being won. Several recent Federal court decisions,
including the recent Supreme Court decision in the Lopez case, have finally begun to place some
restrictions on Congress's use of the Commerce Clause to regulate every aspect of American
life. ... Now the courts have let Congress know that there are limitations to Congress's
authority to legislate in areas only remotely connected to interstate commerce. And yet as we
won the war, we take the enemy's position. We are now the ones who seek to legislate and
regulate medical procedure in every doctor's office in every small town in America. And we
are the ones who now seek to legislate and regulate the fee structure between a lawyer and his
client in any small town in America.
141 CONG. REc. S6047 (1995).
75. U.S. CoNsr., art. I. § 8, cl. 1.
76. See generally Patricia M. Wald, Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old Gifthorse, 65
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 247, 250 (1990) (discussing difference between right and privilege).
77. See id. at 263-64 (discussing this view).
78. In the wake of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (curtailing
congressional power to invoke federal jurisdiction over states), the power of the purse, together with
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, may be the only remaining ways for Congress to get the states to
do what it wants them to do.
79. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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spending power was in pursuit of the general welfare, "especially in light of
the fact that the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress";80
(2) Congress had conditioned the States' receipt of federal funds unambiguous-
ly, "enabling the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the
consequences of their participation"; 8' (3) the condition was related to the
federal interest in particular projects or programs, in this case, safe interstate
highway travel;8a and (4) no other constitutional provision provided an
independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.' This was the most
serious area of contention, inasmuch as the Twenty-First Amendment "grants
the States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale
of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system."'" Nevertheless,
the Court determined that Congress may regulate indirectly, through the
spending power, that which it may not regulate directly.s
The spending power could be a potent force in federal regulation of tort
law. For example, a Clinton-type health care plan, in which a federal subsidy
would guarantee universal health care coverage, could serve as a rationale for
federal intervention in the law of medical malpractice. Indeed, current federal
funding of Medicare and Medicaid, as well as federal assistance to hospitals,
could provide a similar rationale. Other areas of tort law could be affected as
well. If federal highway spending can be used as a wedge for federal regulation
of the drinking age (which affects non-drivers as well as drivers), it certainly
could justify indirect federal regulation of litigation over motor vehicle
accidents.
86
The spending power has its limitations, however. The Dole opinion
acknowledged, for example, that "in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'" ' Indeed, congressional pressure
turned into unconstitutional compulsion in New York v. United States, a case
to which we now turn.
80. Id. at208 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937)). In this case, the Court saw
the condition as "directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds are
expended-safe interstate travel." Id. at 208.
81. Id. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
82. Id. at 208.
83. Id. at 209-12.
84. Id. at205 (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 110 (1980)).
85. Id. at 206, 209.
86. With the repeal of the federally mandated fifty-five mile speed limit on interstate highways, the
federal government now effectively regulates the drinking age of drivers and non-drivers alike, but not
the speed limits on interstate highways.
87. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
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D. New York v. United States and the Problem of Unfunded Mandates
It is clear that Congress may directly regulate a number of activities,
including many activities involving tort law, through the commerce power. It
is also clear that Congress can indirectly regulate in an area outside its
enumerated powers through the spending power, subject to the limitations set
forth in South Dakota v. Dole. What Congress may not do, however, is compel
the states to regulate, even in areas subject to Congress's enumerated powers.
That is the essence of New York v. United States,88 a case with potentially
significant implications with respect to federal regulation of tort law.
New York v. United States involved a challenge to the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.89 The Act created three
incentives for states to dispose of low-level radioactive waste. The Court's
opinion focused on the third incentive, which required states to either provide
for the disposal of all such waste generated within the state or compact region
by January 1, 1996, or take title and possession of the waste.' ° The "take
title" provision was held unconstitutional because it forced states into one of
two coercive "choices": Either comply with federal regulations by January 1,
1996, or take title to the radioactive waste, with all of its costly implications.
The Court explained that while "Congress may attach conditions on the receipt
of federal funds,"91 and could engage in "a program of cooperative federal-
ism,"' it may not "commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory pro-
gram." 93 To do so would infringe upon the sovereignty of the states in
violation of the Tenth Amendment and basic principles of federalism.
More recently, federal district courts have held unconstitutional a provision
of the Brady Act which imposed upon local law enforcement officers a duty to
make a reasonable effort to perform background checks on perspective
purchasers of handguns. For example, in Printz v. United States,94 the court
held that Congress substantially and unconstitutionally commandeered state
executive officers and the Montana legislative process in order to administer
88. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2021j.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e (d)(2)(C). The first two incentives involved: (1) a monetary incentive for
states to join a regional compact or develop a disposal facility; and (2) an access incentive for states that
failed to meet certain deadlines. The first two types of incentives were viewed by the Court as legitimate
exercises of the commerce and spending powers. New York, 505 U.S. at 152-53.
91. New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 206).
92. Id. at 167 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289). The Court stated that "where Congress has the
authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress's power
to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law
pre-empted by federal regulation." Id. (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
93. Id. at 170 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
94. 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
Symposium Issue:429, 1996
Tort Law and Federalism
a federal program. 5 The federal courts seem to be taking seriously New
York's admonition against commandeering state officials into a federal
regulatory role.
At least one tort proposal in the 104th Congress appears to have been
drafted in light of that admonition. H.R. 1195, entitled the "Healthcare
Liability Reform Act of 1995," includes provisions calling for states to set up
mandatory alternative dispute resolution processes with respect to healthcare
liability claims. Section 201(a)(1) of the proposed Act provides that a
healthcare liability action may not be brought in state court unless the claim
that is the subject of the action has been initially resolved under a federally
certified alternative dispute resolution system or, in the case of a state in which
such a system is not in effect, under an alternative federal system established
under § 212(b) of the Act. The alternative federal system would appear to be
consistent with notions of "cooperative federalism." While under New York v.
United States Congress could not direct a state to create an ADR system, it can
give the state a choice of either creating its own ADR system or allowing
claims to be processed through an alternative federal system.'
A mandatory ADR requirement also existed under the ill-fated Clinton
Health Care Reform Plan.97 The Clinton proposal would have imposed the
requirement of setting up ADR systems on the regional alliances established
under the plan. That would have passed constitutional muster also, as it did not
involve the commandeering of state government. A more recent Democratic
proposal, the "Affordable Healthcare for All Americans Act,"98 provides
incentives in the form of grants to states to create state-based malpractice
reforms or professional practice guidelines for medical personnel to ease the
determination of negligence at trial. By providing for incentives instead of
mandates, the bill remains consistent with the spending power, and its
enactment would not amount to congressional coercion.
1. Striking the Proper Balance
A good example of the creative use of federal regulation in tandem with
state tort law is provided by a rule promulgated a decade ago by the United
States Department of Transportation.' The rule required installation of
passive restraints (such as air bags or automatic seat belts) in all new cars
beginning with the model year 1990 unless, prior to that time, mandatory seat
belt usage laws that covered at least two-thirds of the United States population
95. Id.; see also Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994).
96. New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
97. H.R. 3600, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995).
98. S. 168, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). This bill, introduced by Senator Kennedy, retains some
aspects of the Clinton Plan.
99. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1984) [hereinafter DOT Rule].
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had been enacted. The DOT Rule involves an area clearly within federal
competence-automobile safety. It mandates installation of a safety mechanism
unless, prior to a deadline, the states enact legislation more traditionally within
their purview, for example, criminal and civil sanctions for failure to use an
available safety device. Here, the federal regulation had a salutary, but not a
coercive effect. If the states did not act on the problem in a manner consistent
with their competence, then (and only then) would the federal government act,
in a manner traditionally within its competence. Legitimate federal policy was
thereby advanced, while principles of federalism were preserved.
2. Some Current Proposals
A number of proposals before the 104th Congress would impose limitations
and conditions on tort actions normally brought in state courts. Some of these
provisions would place caps on damages; some would alter the basis of
liability;0 1 some would relax rules of joint civil liability; 1' others would
shorten statutes of limitation.' 3 Again, assuming that these measures are a
legitimate exercises of Congress's commerce power, there would appear to be
little constitutional problem with the fact that Congress would be altering the
rules that have applied in the state courts. It is well established that Congress
has the power to enact laws enforceable in state courts. 4 Whether or not
such interventions are good policy is yet another matter, to which we shall now
turn.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING FEDERAL To~r LEGISLATION
As recently as one year ago, we might have confidently stated that the
commerce power is broad enough to encompass virtually any tort legislation
Congress might enact. Lopez threw that proposition into doubt; hence the
foregoing analysis of other constitutional bases for federal tort law. Lopez
notwithstanding, the Constitution remains malleable enough to allow a wide
variety of congressional interventions. But while the Constitution may set limits
on federal involvement, a question remains as to the proper function of the
federal government within these limits. The fact that proposed legislation
100. See, e.g., H.R. 1195, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1995) (placing $250,000 cap on non-
economic damages).
101. See, e.g., H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (imposing only negligence liability on
retailers and other sellers in most products liability actions). The measure was passed by both houses
of Congress, but was vetoed by President Clinton in 1996.
102. See, e.g., H.R. 1195, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205 (1995); S. 454 § 104.
103. See, e.g., H.R. 1195, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1995) (shortening statutes of limitation
to 3 years); S. 454 § 104 (shortening statutes of limitation to 2 years); H.R. 917 § 8 (shortening statutes
of limitation to 2 years).
104. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389 (1973); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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passes constitutional muster does not in itself guarantee that federal intervention
is good policy. We should therefore consider when, as a matter of sound
policy, Congress should intervene (or even preempt state law) and when it
should leave well enough alone.
I begin with the premise that the national government should intervene only
when a particular function cannot be performed adequately by the states. This
premise is based on three concepts. First is the Jeffersonian notion that the
threat of tyranny is diminished when the national government exercises the
minimum power necessary. Division of power between two levels of
government, with most of the routine tasks of government divided in turn
among fifty smaller entities, prevents the concentration of too much power in
a limited number of hands. Just how much tyranny is threatened by nationaliza-
tion of tort law remains a fair question, to which I shall return. 105
Second is the practical notion, oft-repeated by Republicans," ° that all else
being equal, the government closest to the people will best be able to tailor
solutions that address their problems. This is particularly true in tort law,
where there appear to be few economies of scale to be obtained through
national legislation. Admittedly, the homogenization of modem society has
blurred regional distinctions, and it is difficult to justify many differences in
tort law on the basis of local conditions. But the states have succeeded in
fashioning systems of tort law that, for the most part, seem to suit their
purposes. While elements of these systems are in need of repair, it seems
pointless to impose an across-the-board national "fix" without a clearly
articulated justification.
This brings us to our third concept: there is too much law. In an age of
full-time legislatures (and no legislature fits this description better than
Congress), there is a temptation to enact measures to respond to every crisis
and resolve every problem. A doctor is shot at an abortion clinic in Florida,
a courthouse is bombed in Oklahoma, and the urge to legislate, to do
something, to do anything, is too great to resist. The urge persists even though
ample legislation may already exist to address a perceived problem, and even
though some problems simply do not avail themselves of a legislative solution.
Many a redundant statute is enacted because there is a political itch that needs
to be scratched. In many such cases, what is needed is not more law, but more
effective enforcement of existing law.
As often as not, these laws already exist on the state level. My resistance
to redundant federal intervention does not stem from fastidiousness alone.
While state legislatures are as prone as Congress to react to the crisis of the
moment, tort law is the product of years of judicial and legislative shaping on
105. See infra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Remarks of Senator Fred Thompson, supra note 4.
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the state level, and accordingly, it at least represents an effort to fashion a body
of law on a coherent, comprehensive basis. Scattergun federal intervention in
response to the perceived crisis of the moment results in measures that
sometimes overlap and are occasionally inconsistent, but rarely complement
existing state law in a coherent fashion. It is as if a developer, working
overnight, were to erect a mega-mall in the middle of a downtown business
district consisting of fifty old and quaint business establishments. 107
The temptation to resolve all problems through a national solution should
therefore be resisted, unless certain conditions justifying federal intervention
are met. To a great extent, these conditions parallel, but do not mimic, the
constitutional analysis. As guiding principles, I suggest that federal tort
legislation is good policy: (1) where it protects rights guaranteed under the
Constitution that are inadequately protected by state law; (2) where it addresses
matters having a significant impact beyond the borders of a single state; and
(3) where tort regulation dovetails with a major national endeavor, such as a
comprehensive federal funding scheme.
A. Protection of Constitutional Rights
To a great extent, where tort actions in support of constitutional rights are
needed, the right to bring such actions has been established. 18 For example,
there is obviously a need for a cause of action for deprivation of fundamental
rights under color of state law. Official lawlessness resulting in the deprivation
of fundamental rights cannot be tolerated in a society that values liberty, and
it is only appropriate to provide aggrieved individuals with a cause of action
to redress such deprivations."° That the availability of such an action is
implicit in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and finds explicit support in
42 U.S.C. § 1983, is altogether logical and just.
107. Continuing the metaphor, the legal equivalent of the Mall of America takes the form of civil
remedies under The Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West 1984)
[hereinafter RICO]. Grafted onto a statute imposing criminal penalties for interstate racketeering, RICO
has grown like kudzu, snarling everything in its path. See Frederick C. Boucher, Closing the RICO
Floodgates in the Aftermath of Sedima, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 133 (1986); Phillip A. Lacovara &
Geoffrey F. Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of Legitimate Business People: The Runaway Provisions of
Private Civil RICO, 21 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1 (1985-86).
108. Repeated, serious abuses inevitably give rise to lawsuits, at least in a society in which legal
counsel is widely available. Thanks to our system of contingent fees and statutory fee awards, it usually
is. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (providing reasonable attorney's fee to
prevailing party in civil rights action). Lawsuits provide courts the opportunity to declare what the law
is; the more egregious the defendant's conduct, the more likely the plaintiff is to prevail, and to make
favorable law in the course of doing so. Where the plaintiff has suffered a relatively trivial harm, or
where the defendant is acting within reason, or at least without malice, the plaintiff is more likely to
forego a legal remedy, or the parties are more likely to settle. See Marc Galanter. Reading the
Landscapes of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious andLitiglous Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). Situations murmuring only weakly for
redress are less likely to establish a clear legal pathway.
109. See Shapo, supra note 16.
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Far less clear, however, is the need for a federal cause of action against
private individuals who obstruct access to abortion clinics. 110 To the extent
a serious wrong has occurred in this context, it is likely to find redress through
a common law cause of action in the state courts. If there has been harmful or
offensive contact, a battery has occurred;"' if there has been an imminent
threat of such contact, there has been an assault; if the plaintiff has been
physically detained, and cannot break free, a false imprisonment has been
established; if the conduct has been outrageous, and the plaintiff has suffered
severe emotional distress, the plaintiff should be able to make out a prima facie
case of intentional infliction of emotional distress;"' if the clinic has in-
formed the obstructor that her presence is unwanted, and she persists in
remaining on the premises, there has been a trespass to land. I do not wish to
appear too callous (nor do I wish to jeopardize a woman's right to choose), but
it appears that any remaining harm not cognizable under state law is de
minimis. Must we make a federal case of it?
I might feel differently about the criminal sanctions provided under FACE.
If, for example, state prosecutors were unwilling to bring charges against
abortion protestors who violated the state's criminal law (not an unlikely
scenario), Congress might have ample reason to enact a statute empowering the
United States Attorney to step in.' Where the state has in effect denied
protection to a class of citizens, it is altogether appropriate for the national
government to intervene to provide due process and equal protection of the law
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Federal intervention is most
warranted when the states are doing an inadequate job of protecting fundamen-
tal rights. This may occur due either to a gap in the substantive law11 or to
110. Such a cause of action exists under 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West Supp. 1995), the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act [hereinafter FACE].
111. The ability of the courts to adapt traditional torts to new situations, some of which involve
interference with federally protected rights, is demonstrated in Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc.,
424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967). In that case, an employee of the defendant hotel rudely snatched a plate
from the plaintiff, declaring loudly that the hotel did not serve "Negroes." Id. at 628-29. The incident
caused considerable embarrassment to the plaintiff, who was attending a professional conference. The
court recognized a cause of action for battery (i.e., an offensive touching), and awarded damages not
only for the slight physical interference, but for the more significant emotional harm.
112. The relatively new tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress demonstrates that state
common law courts are capable of developing new causes of action as the need arises. See State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46. It
is true that under the widely accepted Restatement view, damages will be awarded only for truly
outrageous conduct, and only when the plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress. But this is a
strength, not a weakness, of this cause of action. The courts cannot provide redress for every trivial
offense. See Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Comrunitarianism: Where Rights Meet Responsibili-
ties, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 649, 667-72, 688-91 (1995).
113. See H.R. Rep. No. 306, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 10, (1994) (finding then-existing state and
local criminal statutes insufficient to restrain nationwide violent conduct aimed at abortion clinics).
114. Some state courts adopt a pigeonhole mentality: If a new fact situation does not fit into a
familiar pattern, relief is denied. E.g., Cucinotti v. Ortmann, 159 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1960) (denying action
for assault due to technical defects in pleading).
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a failure to enforce existing law on the state level. The post-Civil War civil
rights statutes" 5 were utilized to this effect in the 1960s, when lawlessness
against civil rights workers went unpunished by southern officials." 6
A cause of action in tort is enforceable without the cooperation of state
prosecutors, so federal intervention is less warranted in the civil than in the
criminal arena." 7 That remains the case so long as the state courts are
available to entertain such actions. Sovereign and official immunities have the
effect of making courts unavailable for certain claims against the states and
their officials; in these instances, the states fail to provide legal protection for
redress against their own transgressions."' When this rises to a constitutional
level," 9 it is imperative to have a federal cause of action available, along
with resort to the federal courts.
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (insuring right to contract), 1982 (protecting property rights), 1983 (action
for violation of civil rights under color of state law), 1985 (action for injuries due to private conspiracy),
1986 (action against individuals who negligently fail to prevent § 1985 violations). See also 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241, 242 (criminalizing deprivations of civil rights).
116. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (seminal § 1983 case); Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (allowing § 1985 to reach private conspiracies); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (upholding prosecution'under 18 U.S.C. § 241); Miller v. United States,
404 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963 (1969) (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 242).
The criminal statutes would have been unavailing without the determined intervention of a pro-civil
rights administration in Washington.
117. If civil actions were piggy-backed onto criminal prosecutions, as in many civil law countries,
it might make more sense to provide parallel remedies in a federal statute.
118. I doubt that this, without more, will give rise to an equal protection claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment. While access to the courts would appear to be a fundamental right protected
by the Seventh Amendment, that Amendment incorporates the rules of common law, which, at the time
of the Bill of Rights, included the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a state from immunizing its officials where there is a rational
basis for doing so. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). A rational (if not altogether
convincing) basis has frequently been articulated for sovereign immunity. E.g., Garcia v. Albuquerque
Bd. of Educ., 622 P.2d 699 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (holding New Mexico Tort Claims Act does not
violate Equal Protection Clauses of U.S. and New Mexico Constitutions because there were rational
bases for reinstatement of sovereign immunity); Commonwealth v. Smith, 516 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1986)
(establishing limitation of damages does not violate equal protection provisions of U.S. or Pennsylvania
Constitutions); Aubertin v. Board of County Comm'rs of Woodson City, 588 F.2d 781 (10th Cir. 1978)
(holding constitutional Kansas statutory scheme granting immunity to county).
119. In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), the Supreme Court was unwilling to transform
a common tort claim against a state or state official into a Fourteenth Amendment claim, even where
the defendant could assert a defense of sovereign immunity. However, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976), the Court ruled that the states' immunities under the Eleventh Amendment may be trumped
by Congress, acting pursuant to the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
456. It nevertheless remains fairly clear that the underlying claim must rest on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, and that a garden variety tort claim will not do. See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
The federal courts are probably not the appropriate forum in which to adjudicate every bus accident
involving a municipal transit authority. This is not the type of evil against which the Constitution was
designed to protect. It is instructive that under the Federal Tort Claims Act (the most comprehensive
federal tort legislation adopted to date) the applicable state law of torts controls, notwithstanding the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); 28
U.S.C.A. § 1346 (b) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
Tort Law and Federalism
B. Matters Having an Impact Beyond the Borders of a Single State
Matters having an impact beyond the borders of a single state may be
deserving of federal treatment. This impact can be felt in several ways: (1) a
rule of tort liability may have a discriminatory impact on those outside the state
imposing liability; (2) states may be tempted to engage in a "race for the
bottom" in order to compete for the favor of certain enterprises; (3) the limited
reach of state law, or inconsistent rules between states, may result in
externalization of accident costs;ro and (4) enterprises conducting business
in several states may be encumbered by a lack of uniformity among states.
1. Products Liability: A Good Candidate for National Law
The field of products liability would appear to satisfy most of the foregoing
criteria. A state's products liability law is likely to be felt beyond its borders,
because most manufacturers will conduct the majority of their business outside
the state in which the injury occurs."' A rule imposing excessive liability on
out-of-state manufacturers could have a discriminatory impact; in fact, a state
might be inclined to impose excessive product liability on (presumably) out-of-
state manufacturers for the protection of its citizens."2 States therefore may
be tempted to engage in a consumer-oriented variation of the race for the
bottom.13
While long-arm statutes minimize problems of externalization, 24 some
externalization may result from inconsistent rules applied by different states.
For example, in the DES litigation," some state courts embraced a theory
under which several drug companies marketing an identical product could be
120. While state long-arm statutes have minimized the likelihood that a state will not be able to
reach a tortfeasor, certain conduct, such as environmental damage that crosses state lines, may be
difficult for state law mechanisms to redress.
121. For this reason, demanding products liability laws should not place American manufacturers
at a competitive disadvantage. A Japanese or German product that causes injury in the United States is
subject to American products liability law, as is its American counterpart.
122. The impact is not discriminatory in the sense that out-of-state manufacturers are not being
treated any worse than in-state manufacturers, so as to invoke the dormant commerce power. Compare
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (invalidating local ordinance discriminating against
non-local milk processors) with Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (allowing
state to impose non-discriminatory tax on multi-state business). But a state could penalize a class of
litigants (i.e., products liability defendants, who are likely to come from out of state) to the advantage
of another class of litigants (i.e., products liability plaintiffs, who are likely to come from the state
whose law is applied).
123. See infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
124. In the absence of a long-arm statute, a manufacturer could be insulated against liability for
harm it causes outside its home state.
125. Hundreds of women have alleged that they were injured by DES, a drug ingested during
pregnancy'by their mothers and manufactured by several defendants. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
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held liable to a large group of plaintiffs in proportion to the defendants'
respective market shares. Some of these courts (for example, those in
California and New York) have defined the market as a national one; others
(e.g., Wisconsin and Washington) have allowed the market to be determined
individually in each case. Under the Washington scheme, the relevant market
could be defined as "a particular pharmacy, or county, or State, or even the
country, depending on the circumstances the case presents." 12 The potential
for externalization in such instances is evident. A pharmaceutical company
marketing drugs only in the Pacific Northwest could be held liable under a
localized market theory in Washington, while at the same time it could be held
liable under a national market theory in New York, even though it had never
marketed DES in New York. Meanwhile, a competing company that had
marketed only in the East would have its liability diluted in the New York
litigation, while being spared liability in Washington. A consistent national rule
as to market share would avoid such externalization. 127
Finally, manufacturers and other suppliers operating across state lines may
be encumbered by a lack of legal uniformity. An individual state's regulatory
measure (such as California's rule regarding catalytic converters in automo-
biles) might impose additional costs on manufacturers, who would undergo the
additional expense of complying with that state's special requirements. Such a
measure might have extraterritorial effects as well. Since manufacturers in a
national market find differentiation more difficult than compliance with the
requirements of the most demanding state, that state's legislature would in
effect take on the role of a national legislature. A state's products liability law,
however, is unlikely to operate in similar fashion. Do manufacturers
differentiate between the type of product they must produce for California (with
its strict liability standard)1" and that which they can get away with in North
Carolina (with its negligence standard)? 29 If strict liability means imposing
liability on a manufacturer despite its exercise of reasonable care, will a
manufacturer somehow still be more careful because it is cognizant of
California's more demanding rule? 30 Will it be a little less careful as to
Oregon-bound products because that state (which imposes a form of strict
126. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1077 (citing George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507,511-12 (1987)).
127. It would not matter which rule was chosen; as long as all courts were obliged to follow one
rule or the other, externalization would be avoided.
128. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
129. See Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 268 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. 1980) (declining to adopt strict
liability).
130. Judge Posner has suggested that the manufacturer will not exercise any more care, but might
use its superior information regarding the product's unavoidable risks in pricing the product. The higher
price will induce consumers to turn to other, presumably safer products. RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIs OF LAw 175-79 (4th ed. 1992). If manufacturers spread the risk nationwide
through the pricing mechanism, California's more demanding rule will protect North Carolina consumers
and will have an extraterritorial effect.
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liability)131 requires plaintiffs to show the feasibility of alternative de-
signs,132 while California does not?133 I can see how a manufacturer's
insurance premiums would be higher for marketing products in California
(because liability will be imposed more frequently), but I cannot see how its
behavior would be altered. If this thesis is accurate, it would appear that
variations in state law have a minimal effect on the design, manufacturing and
marketing of products.
134
The greatest inefficiencies to be addressed by a uniform law might involve
transaction costs. Nationwide distributors of products require specialized legal
counsel in every state, and their insurance underwriters must separately
calculate their exposure in accordance with each state's products liability
law. 35 The variety of legal hurdles manufacturers must clear in each state
might be viewed as tariffs imposed by the individual states to the detriment of
the national economy. This was precisely the type of problem the Framers tried
to avoid by abandoning the Articles of Confederation in favor of the
Constitution.'36
Ironically, the states themselves have nationalized commercial law by
enacting the Uniform Commercial Code. This code addresses the issue of
products liability through the warranty provisions of Article 2.111 Just as the
UCC was gaining widespread acceptance, however, states began to recognize
additional products liability theories through common law adjudication.'
The problem has been compounded by the federal government's establishment
131. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
132. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978).
133. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
134. Professor Gary Schwartz has indicated at least two instances in which competing standards
might place manufacturers in a quandary. First, some states recognize an "obvious dangers" defense,
whereas others require a manufacturer to employ reasonable alternative designs to eliminate even
obvious dangers. Professor Schwartz suggests that a manufacturer distributing cigarette lighters under
the second rule will feel obliged to incorporate child-resistant features into the design, whereas under
the first rule, it will not. Second, some jurisdictions impose an obligation to make reasonable design
changes to prevent dangerous modifications of industrial machinery; others recognize such modifications
as a defense available to the manufacturer. A manufacturer will feel obliged to make these modifications
in the first type of jurisdiction; this effort would be unnecessary in the second type. For further
discussion of this issue, see Gary T. Schwartz, Assessing the Adequacy of State Products Liability
Lawmaking, in YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION/YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW, SYMPOSiuM:
CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM 359 (1996).
135. Even here, I am not sure that the inefficiencies are substantial. Even with a national products
liability law, manufacturers would have to retain local counsel to try cases. Would it be any less
expensive for such counsel to be current on national law than on state law? Likewise, insurance
underwriters still may have to make regionalized calculations, based on factors such as degree of market
penetration and generosity ofjuries in a given locality. Accordingly, scale economies under a national
rule would likely be insignificant.
136. See TRIBE, supra note 10, at 404.
137. U.C.C. §§ 2-313 (express warranties), 2-314 and 315 (implied warranties), 2-318 (third party
beneficiaries), 2-715 (incidental and consequential damages), 2-719 (contractual limitation of remedy).
138. The parade was led by California, with Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897
(Cal. 1963). At least one state's high court has declined to accept Greenman because in its view, the
U.C.C. preempted the field. Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980).
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of agencies with important regulatory authority in this field, e.g., the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Department of Transportation, and
the Food and Drug Administration. 139 Problems of preemption invariably
abound, providing full employment for attorneys, but restless nights and
considerable expense for litigants. 14 A comprehensive, preemptive federal
products liability statute would eliminate this and related problems.141
Unfortunately, most products liability legislation currently under consider-
ation takes a piecemeal approach. The legislation, if enacted, would not fully
supplant state law. Instead, it would graft federal limitations onto state causes
of action, in the form of punitive damage caps, 42 special rules pertaining to
retailers, 143 and statutes of repose.'" The labyrinth of conflicting standards
of liability, imposed largely through state common law adjudication, would
remain, with an additional layer of complexity imposed by the federal
government. The result would not be conducive to the uniformity so
desperately needed in this area. 45 Instead, it would provide gainful employ-
ment for lawyers, who could bill countless hours reconciling underlying state
products liability law with the new federal provisions. New and wondrous
preemption issues would arise.
The current state of products liability law resembles that of antitrust law
just prior to its codification. A little over a century ago, the law of antitrust
was a matter of state common law, for which the principal remedy was the tort
of unfair competition. Starting with the Sherman Act, antitrust became largely
a matter of federal statutory law. This was entirely appropriate, due to the
ramifications of anti-competitive practices on interstate commerce. The law of
139. Admittedly, advocates of a diffusion of power among governments might applaud the fact that
general deterrence (in the form of tort liability) is controlled by the states, while specific deterrence (in
the form of regulatory measures) is in the hands of the national government. For definitions of general
and specific deterrence, see infra note 183.
140. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor
Co., 665 A.2d 345 (N.H. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., Ford Motor Co. v. Tebbetts, 1996 U.S. LEXIS
487, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (1996). In products liability cases, juxtaposition of a federal regulatory scheme
over a system of state common law gives rise to two issues: (1) whether the federal regulation preempts
the field, to the exclusion of state tort liability (an issue of federal law, under the Supremacy Clause);
and (2) whether a manufacturer's compliance with federal regulations renders a product non-defective
per se (a question of state law).
141. A federal statute would be preferable to a uniform law. The former would require enactment
by only one legislature. As Professor Priest points out, it is more convenient to deal with a single
national legislature than with fifty state legislatures. Then again, a prominent Republican once remarked,
"You can fool all of the people some of the time, and some of the people all of the time, but you can't
fool all of the people all of the time." A series of legislative hurdles may provide good protection
against folly. Perhaps more significantly, a national products liability law would ultimately be interpreted
by a single court (the Supreme Court), thereby making the law truly uniform.
142. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108 (1995) This bill was passed by both Houses, but
vetoed by President Clinton in 1996.
143. Id. § 103.
144. Id. § 106.
145. Section 5 of the legislation would, however, impose a uniform rule as to product misuse or
alteration, thereby addressing one of Professor Schwartz's dilemmas. See supra note 134.
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products liability should undergo a similar transformation. Unlike antitrust law,
however, federal products liability law should be preemptive. It would provide
little relief from the present state of affairs if a federal products liability statute
were to stand alongside as many as fifty-one state schemes.'4
Professor Morton L Horwitz has suggested that the Supreme Court's
decision in Swift v. 7son47 heralded a regime of "general commercial law"
that served business interests for almost a century.148 Arguably, a federal
products liability statute would do much the same thing, at a time in which
business interests are in ascendancy in Congress. 149 But notwithstanding one's
politics, nationalization of products liability law is justified on the basis of
neutral principles. 5 ° The allocation of responsibility among the state and
federal governments should be a matter of sound principle, not political
expedience.
Thought should be given to issues regarding jurisdiction over federal tort
claims, in products liability and other fields. Most federal products liability
bills have included a provision depriving the federal district courts of subject
matter jurisdiction;' such a provision is not conducive to the goal of
uniformity. It is instructive that the European Union has targeted the law of
146. That federal antitrust law does not preempt state law may be a historical accident. At the time
of the Sherman Act (1890), the commerce power was not nearly as extensive as it is today. See, e.g.,
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Restraints on trade therefore could not be
regulated through congressional action alone. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrRUsr PARADOX 20
(1978). Today, the commerce power is broad and deep enough to allow comprehensive national
regulation of both antitrust and products liability.
147. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). In Swift, the Supreme Court stated that in the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction, federal courts were bound not by state law, but could decide cases on the basis of "the
general principles of commercial law." Id. at 22. Swft was overruled in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), in which the Court held that state law would be applied as to substantive issues in
diversity cases.
148. MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 245-56 (1977).
149. The federal district courts, under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, have enacted a series
of local procedural rules. Together with the nationalization of substantive law, these rules might return
us to the pre-Erie, pre-Federal Rules days in which federal court procedure was local and substantive
law was national.
150. A comprehensive federal products liability statute, friendlier to plaintiffs than those presently
under consideration, was proposed approximately fifteen years ago. S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982). The proposal originated in the Carter Administration's Commerce Department as a potential
uniform law, but was later introduced by Senator Kasten (R-Mo.) as a federal act that would preempt
state law. The measure was opposed by consumer advocates and plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers, who
hoped for further advances in the state courts. In fact, the law of products liability had reached a high
water mark for plaintiffs, whose interests might have been best served by codifying the law as it stood
at that time.
151. See, e.g., H.R. 956 § 302. These provisions are prompted by concern over a burgeoning
federal caseload. But in reality, most state court dockets suffer from far more overcrowding than their
federal counterparts. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, STATE JUSTICE INSITUTE, AND
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992
(1994) (noting that the more than 93 million cases that were filed in trial courts in 1992 underscores the
fact that state courts are the primary arena for resolution of legal disputes in the United States); see also
Judith S. Kaye, Federalism Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at A29. In defense of H.R. 956,
the bill in § 301 makes decisions of federal appeals courts mandatory precedent within their respective
circuits, thereby aiding uniformity of application.
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products liability as the one area of tort law in which uniformity was deemed
vital, issuing a directive to that effect in 1985.152 Jurisdiction over efforts to
comply with the directive lies in the European Court of Justice, much as
ultimate jurisdiction over any federal products liability law should reside with
our Supreme Court.
2. Professional Malpractice and Beyond
Beyond products liability, the case for federal tort legislation is not nearly
as clear. Were Congress to enact a universal health insurance plan, as once
envisioned by President Clinton, federal regulation of malpractice actions might
be justified as a cost containment measure. I am not yet convinced, however,
that federal involvement in Medicare and Medicaid funding is sufficient
justification for a national law of medical malpractice. Despite the growth of
tertiary care facilities, medical practice remains largely local. Current
Republican efforts to regulate medical malpractice claims may allow doctors
to have their cake and eat it, too: Having defeated the Clinton health care plan
(which would have expanded federal involvement in the provision of medical
services), doctors may now enjoy federal limitations on malpractice actions that
only a plan such as Clinton's would have justified.153
In other areas of tort law, proponents of federal reform proposals have a
substantial burden of persuasion. I have already discussed how insurance might
provide a constitutional justification for federal control of tort litigation,
including even "backyard" torts that otherwise involve neither civil rights nor
interstate commerce.154 But Congress has historically deferred to the states
for purposes of insurance regulation,'5 5 and most insurance underwriting
therefore proceeds on a state-by-state basis. The insurance industry is indeed
concerned with national markets, but those markets are as likely to be on Wall
Street and in real estate as in our courtrooms. 15 While insurance might
provide a nexus with interstate commerce, that nexus would be no more than
a pretext for federal intrusion into matters that are for the most part local:
garden variety torts such as parking lot fender benders and premises liability.
152. Council Directive 210/29, Liability for Defective Products, 1985 O.1.; see also Ferdinando
Albanese and Louis F. Del Duca, Developments in European ProductLiability, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 192,
195 (1987).
153. For example, H.R. 3103, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) originated as an act to assure health
insurance portability. House Republicans thereafter added a series of Christmas tree ornaments to reduce
physicians' exposure to malpractice suits. See id. §§ 271-283.
154. See supra text accompanying note 73.
155. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (ERISA legislation
daferring to state regulation of insurance industry).
156. Critics of insurance industry tort reform proposals claim that these measures are prompted
largely by the ebb and flow of real estate and financial markets, and not excessive tort liability. See
Robert M. Ackerman, Medical Malpractice: A 27me for More Talk and Less Rhetoric, 37 MERCER L.
REv. 725, 727 (1986); Glen 0. Robinson, The MedicalMalpractice Crisis ofthe 1970s:A Retrospective,
49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 5, 9 (1986).
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While a legitimate federal interest in traffic on interstate highways might carry
along the former class of cases, it is hard to find a legitimate justification for
federal involvement in the latter.
Despite the globalization of legal practice,' 57 regulation of the legal
profession remains largely a state matter, and it is difficult to justify federal
regulation of lawyer conduct (e.g., through provisions limiting contingent fees)
in tort litigation alone.'58 As I have stated elsewhere, the litigation explosion
of the past few decades is attributable more to a growth in commercial
litigation than to tort actions.159 While the 104th Congress has moved to
curtail stockholders' derivative suits,"6 it has done little to reduce the volume
of corporate litigation that currently clogs the courts. Nor has Congress moved
to assess fees to offset the subsidy of corporate dispute resolution provided by
the federal and state governments through their respective court systems. '6
Again, I sense that it is a matter of whose ox is being gored.
3. Tort Reform and the Race to the Bottom
Fear that a Gresham's law of competition between states might produce
undesirable results has served as an argument for nationalizing certain areas of
law. This thesis has been articulated by Professor William L. Cary in the
context of corporate law.'62 In 1974 Professor Cary suggested that Delaware
had attracted far more than its share of incorporations by enacting laws giving
maximum flexibility to corporate managers and minimum protection to
shareholders. He feared that states would engage in a "race for the bot-
tom" 6 3 in which they would attempt to outdo each other for the favor of
corporate managers, to the ultimate detriment of shareholders. His solution was
the enactment of federal legislation that would create a fairer playing field for
157. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community's Legal Ethics Code,
7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 345 (1993).
158. One Republican proposal, the "Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995," H.R. 10, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., includes an "attorney accountability" provision stating that it is the "sense of
Congress" that each state should require written disclosure as to services performed and hours expended
under contingency fee agreements. Id. § 104. No mandate is imposed, however, consistent with New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
A national system of bar admission, similar to that enjoyed by physicians, might indeed have merit.
It might lower barriers to competition and make legal services more widely available. However, it could
stifle efforts by individual states to adopt more creative standards of bar admission than the rigid,
doctrinal bar examinations that now predominate.
159. See Ackerman, supra note 112, at 687-88.
160. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of December 22, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737.
161. See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CmI. L. REV. 366, 392-93 (1986).
162. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974).
163. Id. at 666, 705.
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corporations, managers, and stockholders. 1"
In the context of tort law, a state could conceivably try to attract certain
enterprises by easing the burdens imposed on those enterprises through the law
of torts. For example, a state might create an atmosphere more hospitable to
polluters by repealing environmental regulations which, directly or indirectly,
create standards used in environmental tort litigation. 16 Alternatively, a state
(through its legislature or its courts) might impose higher burdens on plaintiffs
attempting to prove environmental claims, for example, by tightening up rules
of causation. States might engage in a scramble to lure polluters through these
devices, thereby engaging in a race for the bottom in which the public interest
gets short shrift.
There is far less likelihood of a corporate-oriented race for the bottom in
the context of product liability law. Defective products cause accidents in their
state of use, not in their state of manufacture. States are therefore unlikely to
attract manufacturers by enacting lenient products liability laws. In a products
liability suit, the plaintiff is far more likely than the defendant to be a resident
of the controlling state. Legislators and judges looking to advance the interest
of their state's citizens are, therefore, likely to promote the most demanding
products liability laws."6 Therefore, if products liability were to involve a
race for the bottom in the form of bad law, it would be a race to the advantage
of accident victims and to the disadvantage of corporate interests.167
The law pertaining to retailers might provide an exception to the above
analysis. A retailer sued in a products liability suit is likely to be located in the
state whose law is applied. A state wishing to create an attractive climate for
retailers might, therefore, enact product liability legislation friendlier to
retailers if not manufacturers. Several states have, in fact, done so."6
164. Id. at 700-04.
165. As a practical matter, it is far more likely that states attempting to attract or retain polluters
will simply ease up on the enforcement of environmental regulations. The recent experiences of
Pennsylvania and New York under newly-elected Republican governors may be instructive in that
regard.
166. This thesis was most emphatically asserted in a book by Justice Richard Neely of the West
Virginia Supreme Court. RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILrrY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE
RESCUED FROM STATE COURT POLITICS (1988). Justice Neely later "proved" his own thesis in
Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781 (W.Va. 1991). These events are very neatly
described by Professors Eaton and Talarico. Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Testing Two
Assumptions About Federalism and Tort Reform, in CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM, supra note
134, at 371, 374-76.
167. Consumer advocates might call this a "race for the top," but adherents of the Chicago School
of legal economics would almost certainly take exception. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to
the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's CorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U.
L. REV. 913 (1982). Were states inclined to overly penalize foreign manufacturers through their
products liability law, the result would be inefficient and unfair.
168. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-106.1 (Harrison 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-3 (Burns Supp.
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (Baldwin 1994) (seller not strictly liable); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-01.3-05. (Supp. 1995); TEX Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.002 (West Supp. 1996)
(manufacturer to indemnify seller).
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Interestingly, the most prominent product liability reform legislation before the
104th Congress would have preempted such a race for the bottom by providing
its most significant protection to retailers.
16 9
As a practical matter, I doubt that the law of torts plays a significant role
in attracting or repulsing businesses to or from a given state.17 Labor
conditions, the amount of direct government regulation, and, above all, taxes
play far more significant roles in this regard than indirect regulation through
the law of torts.17' However, tort-sensitive enterprises, such as medicine,
might be the object of a race for the bottom. A state known to be hospitable
to medical malpractice claims might indeed drive away physicians, particularly
in high risk specialties. This appears to have prompted some states to enact
medical malpractice reform legislation during the 1980s.11 A nation that
cared about the rational, fair, and efficient distribution of medical services
might therefore wish to avoid a race for the bottom by enacting a uniform law
of medical malpractice.
Unfortunately, one medical malpractice reform measure now before
Congress serves only to perpetuate a race for the bottom in that field. The
proposed "Health Care Liability Reform Act of 1995 "173 would, inter alia,
limit economic and punitive damages and attorneys' fees, eliminate the
collateral source rule, provide for periodic payments of future losses, and
eliminate joint liability in health care liability actions. By its terms, the Act
would supersede state law, except for those provisions of state law imposing
169. H.R. 956, the "Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996," would have
imposed liability only for negligence, and not strict liability, on sellers of products who are not
manufacturers, except under limited circumstances. Id. § 103.
170. My intuitive skepticism regarding a race for the bottom with respect to products liability is
borne out by Professors Eaton's and Talarico's empirical research. Eaton & Talarico, supra note 166,
at 399-410.
171. From March, 1989 to March, 1993, New York State lost over half a million jobs. James
Traub, Doilface, NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 1996, at 29. It is no coincidence that New York had the
highest state and local taxes in the nation during this period, or that it had a regulatory environment that
businesses came to regard as oppressive. Id.
172. See, e.g., FLA. SrAT. ANN. CH. 766.303 (Harrison 1994) (Florida Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Plan); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5002 (Michie Supp. 1995) (Virginia Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Compensation Program). Both of these measures have no-fault provisions which,
while protecting physicians from ruinous liability, provide a modicum of protection to injured parties.
173. H.R. 1195, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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greater restrictions on liability or damages than the Act.174 The Act therefore
permits (and perhaps encourages) a scramble among states to enact health care
liability measures offering greater protection to health care providers and
commensurately less protection to malpractice victims.
C. Major National Endeavors
Were we to become serious about a national health care plan and enact
universal health care coverage under a single-payer system, then a national no-
fault insurance plan for medical mishaps might make a good deal of sense. The
transaction costs of tort litigation would be largely eliminated, and universal
health coverage would in itself provide a no-fault remedy for a major part of
the malpractice victim's out-of-pocket costs. Evidence that there is little
correlation between malpractice claims and actual incidents of malpractice 75
lends further support to the idea of a no-fault remedy. The New Zealand
experience suggests, however, that an across-the-board national no-fault
system, supplanting virtually all common law tort actions, may remove safety
incentives from too great a range of human endeavors. 176
It would be difficult to envision a truly comprehensive no-fault accident or
health plan on a state-by-state basis. Cradle-to-grave schemes enacted by
individual states are likely to encounter externalization through adverse
selection in a nation with as much interstate mobility as ours. Unhealthy people
will move to states with more generous plans, thereby bankrupting them."7
174. Section 102(b) of the proposed Act provides:
The provisions of this Act will supersede any State law ... only to the extent that State law
permits the recovery of a greater amount of damages by a plaintiff than that authorized under
section 204, permits the awarding of a greater amount of attorneys' fees than what is authorized
under section 203, reduces the applicability or scope of the regulation of periodic payment of
future damages authorized under section 204(b), or establishes a longer period during which a
health care liability claim may be initiated than that permitted under section 202. The provisions
of this Act shall supersede any Federal or State law which mandates reimbursement from the
plaintiff's recovery for the cost of collateral source benefits. The provisions of this Act shall not
preempt any State law that imposes greater restrictions on liability or damages than those
provided herein.
175. See Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to
Negligence, 325 N. ENG. J. MED. 245 (1991).
176. In 1972, New Zealand enacted a comprehensive no-fault scheme to supplant most forms of
liability in tort. Preliminary data indicate that accident rates have risen significantly since adoption of
the plan, suggesting that incentives for safety may diminish in the absence of traditional tort liability.
Richard S. Miller, The Future of New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, 11 U. HAW. L. REV.
1, 43-45 (1989). But see Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience,
73 CAL. L. REV. 976, 984-94 (1985) (indicating no increase in motor vehicle accident rates during 1964
to 1980 time period).
177. No fault workers compensation schemes do not encounter this problem, because they are based
on a closed system involving an employee, his/her employer, and possibly an insurer. No fault motor
vehicle insurance schemes impose insurance requirements on out-of-state motorists and thereby have
extraterritorial effects. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 10-4-711(4)(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 38a-371(a)(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); MN. STAT. ANN. § 65 B. 48 (West 1986
& Supp. 1995). They also create overlapping insurance requirements and duplicative costs.
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Only a national plan could deal with this problem comprehensively. Yet a
national no-fault plan would be a major, radical step, with potentially dramatic
consequences. The widespread resistance to President Clinton's health care plan
in 1994 suggests that the nation is not prepared to give the federal government
sweeping control over such a broad system of compensation.
D. "States' Rights" and Other Myths
I have argued on the preceding pages for a presumption against federal
intervention in tort law, suggesting that clear justification is necessary before
wresting this or any other area of regulation from the states. Nevertheless, I
must express a degree of skepticism whenever the mantra of "states' fights"
is used to justify public policy. In my youth, "states' rights" was code for
officially-sanctioned racism, and a century earlier it served as a laundered
rationale for slavery. My fear now is that it is being used to cover a similarly
pernicious agenda.
178
In terms of basic political principle, I can see nothing in the natural order
of things that reposes rights in what are essentially political subdivisions of a
national government. In international relations, states indeed have rights with
respect to each other, but the rights of the American states as sovereigns have
their basis in historical accident rather than in any justice-based notions that
survive to the present day. States do not have rights; people do. As Justice
O'Connor has stated:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities,
or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To
the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and
state governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is
not just an end in itself: "Rather, federalism secures to citizens the
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power." 179
As with separation of powers, division of powers promotes the objective
of maximizing liberty and minimizing the threat of government tyranny through
178. My concerns were aptly articulated by the Tappitt brothers, Click and Clack, of National
Public Radio's Car Talk, in a July, 1996, broadcast:
C/ick: The dingalings in Congress who voted to repeal the 55 mile an hour limit... they're
all jerks .... They should all be ashamed of themselves!
Clack: It's a matter of reasserting states' ights .... They want to get it so that the states that
are in favor of having higher speed limits can have them, and then they will just take this a step
further and they can do things like reinstitute slavery and some of the other things that have
been usurped from the states over the years.
179. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 759 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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concentration of powers in a single government.18 But the nationalization of
tort law poses a rather small threat of government tyranny. While I might
doubt the wisdom of federal micromanagement through the enactment of
FACE, or of federal intermeddling with attorneys' fees, neither measure brings
forth visions of jack-booted stormtroopers or even orderly Redcoats marching
on Concord.
Unless it involves state-sponsored social insurance, tort law does not entail
massive government spending or taxation, nor does it involve governmental
compulsion. Rather, the law of torts addresses primarily the remedies that the
courts will allow for the breach of duties owed by and to private persons.
181
As a consequence, tort law involves only indirect limitations on liberty. It
requires no action on the part of an individual unless prior action has been
taken." It involves not the specific deterrence of direct regulation, but only
general deterrence in the form of a damage remedy incurred when the failure
to take adequate precautions results in injury."83 It requires no bureaucracy
aside from the judiciary, the "least dangerous branch"" of government.
It is therefore difficult to see how the accretion of power in the national
government with respect to the law of torts would result in a serious threat to
individual liberty. Perhaps the greatest threat posed by federalization of tort
law involves the magnification of error: If a mistake is made with respect to
a national law of torts, it is likely to be a substantial one, with a nationwide
impact, rather than an impact limited to a single state. To the extent innovation
is desirable, it may be preferable to pursue the Brandeisian concept of the
states as our laboratories," rather than engaging in nationwide experimenta-
tion. This is entirely in keeping with Gingrichian notions of devolution. Social
tinkering may have a salutary effect on a state-by-state basis, but it is
potentially dangerous on a national basis. 86 The rule of unintended conse-
quences is bound to raise its ugly head.
180. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 18.
181. The major exception involves governmental torts, discussed supra notes 12-22 and
accompanying text.
182. Compare, for example, the military draft, which compels private individuals to serve their
country simply by reason of citizenship.
183. Specific deterrence, a collective approach, uses the political process to regulate directly, for
example, through a proscriptive government regulation. General deterrence uses the market to determine
the degree to which accidents will be allowed. GUIDO CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 69, 95 (4th ed. 1975).
184. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, TE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLMCs (1962).
185. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
186. Conservatives, who have justifiably criticized liberals for engaging in social experiments, now
promote an agenda replete with such experiments, based more on theoretical formulas than on concrete
evidence of effectiveness.
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The foregoing discussion suggests a paradox. As suggested earlier, some
measures (like universal no-fault health and accident insurance) are likely to be
effective only if implemented on a nationwide basis. Yet national measures
involve substantially greater risks. Striking the proper balance is not easy. To
date, however, it appears that our system of checks and balances has deterred
the federal government from embarking on grandiose, harebrained schemes.
There is something to be said for legislative gridlock.
CONCLUSION
In this era of the "new federalism," it is only fair to recall some rather
extraordinary accomplishments of our national government. Professor Walter
Dellinger has recently stated:
[Our national government] is the government that with extraordinary
courage successfully fought the war to end slavery; it is the government
that marshalled the resources to bring the nation out of the Great
Depression; it is the government that liberated Europe from the
darkness of the Third Reich; it is the government that created a social
safety net for older citizens, and it is the government that brought an
end to state-sponsored racial segregation."s
These are rather extraordinary achievements, which came about in response
to grave crises and required the marshalling of significant resources beyond
those available to the individual states. Perhaps the national government had
best focus on these major enterprises rather than engaging in micro-manage-
ment of the law of torts. Federal intervention is most justified where it protects
fundamental rights, addresses matters with significant interstate impact, or
advances a major national endeavor.
In a sense, I wish I could present an overarching theory as to the respective
roles of the national and state governments in tort law. But the very complexity
of our federal system renders it unavailing of any single, universal "fix." This
is a blessing. The matrix of governments, branches, and interlocking
constituencies serves as a barrier to zealots touting a "cure all" for the nation's
ills. Our solutions are therefore likely to be found in a dynamic mixture of
constitutional theory, sound policy, and practical politics.
187. Walter E. Dellinger, III, Remarks at Session on The Anti-Federalist Revival, Association of
American Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 6, 1996).

